UGANDA AND CONTEMPORARY WORLD ORDER

UGANDA AND CONTEMPORARY WORLD ORDER. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND - UGANDA Pre-Colonial Societies; The Introduction of Foreign Religions; British Protectorate Policies and The 1900 Agreement; Indirect Rule and the Privileged Place of the Baganda Oligarchy; Direct Rule; The (Under)development of Local Industry; The (Under)development of the North; The Language Problem; Dislocation and Destruction: Independence – 1986; NRM and the Challenges of Reform 1.1 PRE-COLONIAL SOCIETIES Before the British renamed and reconfigured the territory, what is now Uganda was then an array of kingdoms (Buganda, Bunyoro, Ankole and Toro) and communities located in the Lango, Acholi, Madi, West Nile, Bukedi, Bugisi, Busoga, Teso, Karamoja, Sebei and Kigezi regions. It was a heterogeneous area, with a variety of customary practices, social and political structures. Across the northern region, population was scarce and the environment unduly harsh; people engaged either in herding or shifting agriculture. Pastoral groups, such as the Karamojong, had little opportunity to settle in social units and family relations took precedence over the clan. Among agriculturalists, such as the Acholi, people were able to form larger social units but these were temporary, as even these groups had to move every few years. For both, the little surplus available from their labours was used within the households, where there was minimal division of labour between men, women, old and young. Clans focused on religious practice, and the main social distinction that existed was between ‘elders and nonelders’. Elders were elected to serve on Community councils but were not entitled to special tributes or other privileges. They were responsible for selecting clan leaders who, in turn, chaired the councils. Clan leaders were responsible to the council, and could not make war or peace without consensus. Similarly, elders had joint responsibility for resolving disputes. Inter-clan violence was common and deadly; clans fought over cattle, land, women and goods. It was difficult to maintain peace in these regions. These non-stratified social systems existed in much of North and Eastern Uganda (among the Lango, Madi, Lugbara, Karamajong, Acholi, Iteso, Sebei, Alur, Kakwa, Jonamu, Japadhola, Gwere, Samia, Bagishu Badama, Banyuli, Bagwere) and in some parts of the South (among the Bakiga, Bakongo and Bamba) (However, these communal norms had begun to change even before Uganda was made a protectorate in 1894. In all, except the most remote communities, increased contacts with other groups resulted in more centralised forms of governance, which were considered necessary for preparation and defence in war.) In the greater part of the South, where there were better environmental conditions and higher levels of development, feudal kingdoms developed (among the Baganda, Banyankore, Batoro, Banyoro and Basoga), in which peasants were required to pay tributes to the lords. The surplus was largely paid in kind and used for consumption, though there was ‘non-competitive’ trade within regions and across states. Mamdani notes that particularly in the South, ‘women were a means of production, to be owned, exchanged, and distributed. The most advanced forms of accumulation were cattle and women, in that order’. Labour was not merely divided by sex and age; there were different tasks for peasant men, women and slaves. Further, there were skilled artisans and carpenters who provided services to the lords and regional specializations (such as copper-works in Toro and canoe building in Busoga) had begun to develop. There were important distinctions across southern Kingdoms. Ankole became a class-based society, in which the Bahima ruling class controlled the use of violence and owned the cattle. Bunyoro-Kitare, which was the most powerful kingdom in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, had fairly rigid social divisions between its pastoral aristocrats and agricultural serfs. Buganda was, reputedly, a more fluid society, in which peasants could be recruited to higher positions. Eventually, these distinctions contributed to Bunyoro’s demise and Buganda’s ascendancy, for while the Kingdom of Buganda was able to build its administration by recruiting the ‘ordinary’ people, Bunyoro relied increasingly on a group of elite pastoralists. Nevertheless, compared with Ankole and Bunyoro, the Buganda monarchy had more control over the use of force. In Ankole and Bunyoro, territorial leaders had the power to contest the kings’ actions. The Kabakas (kings/heads of all clans heads) of Buganda had substantial authority, and eventually used it to assert their right to kill offending subjects. By the nineteenth century, kingdoms regularly used raids to expand their territory and influence. Fixed group associations did not have the personal significance they subsequently gained. Ethnic association became substantially more politicised and tribalised during and after British rule. However, there were numerous conflicts: Buganda-Bunyoro tensions and wars preceded the British and so did those between more and less powerful regions, such as Buganda and the eastern territories of Bukedi, Busoga and Bugisi. Intraethnic conflicts were also quite common; Many was the result of religious differences among the Catholics, Protestants and Muslims. 1.2 BRITISH PROTECTORATE POLICIES AND THE 1900 AGREEMENT Captain Lugard’s mandate in Uganda was to extend the commercial enterprises of the Imperial British East Africa Company. He executed his role effectively, obtaining treaties and facilitating British control, without much of the local population even being aware of developments. Protectorate status differed somewhat from colonisation. It relied more on treaties with the indigenous population and less on using British finances to support the economy. Therefore, Sir Harry Johnston, who was appointed Special Commissioner for the Uganda Protectorate in 1899, was instructed to ensure that ‘trade [was] established on a smooth basis; administration [was] placed on a permanent and satisfactory footing; control over taxation [was] exercised without arousing native suspicions; no effort [was] spared to preserve external appearances by which the collection of revenue and its expenditure took place within the formal structure of traditional authority; governance and development of Uganda [were] carried out with as little reliance as possible on metropolitan finances. The Uganda Agreement of 1900 was the key to achieving these objectives. The principal parties to the Agreement were the Baganda oligarchy (who wanted to retain their traditional power and desired long-term British military support to guarantee their security) and Johnston, the representative of the British Crown (who needed to secure the best arrangement feasible for Britain’s economic profit). Under the final terms, the British allocated 10,034 square miles of land to the ‘great chiefs’ and the Royal Household, and retained all uncultivated, waste and forest lands for the British Crown. An additional eight thousand square miles of land were divided among notables and lesser chiefs (Mamdani, 1996). Peasants now became tenants of the new Baganda mailo (mile-owning) landlords, the majority of whom were Protestants. Native Councils would continue to exist and chiefs were required to collect taxes. Johnston maintained that ‘enough taxes should be collected to enable the government of the Protectorate to be run on a basis of complete self-sufficiency’. 1.2.1 Indirect Rule and the Privileged Place of the Baganda Oligarchy Sathyamurthy (1986) argues that the Uganda Agreement both legitimised the social changes that had already taken place in Buganda (among religious groups and among clan heads, peasants and the oligarchy) and triggered new tensions and conflicts within Buganda and between the Baganda and other ethnic groups. Among the Baganda, economic inequalities increased as the new landowners managed and exploited the peasantry. Unequal relationships between Buganda and other regions, particularly Bunyoro, also increased as the Baganda oligarchy now had administrative power. The British actively stratified the kingdoms: Though Ankole and Toro did not enjoy Buganda’s special standing, they were also given Agreement status; however, Bunyoro was treated as ‘enemy territory’. Baganda chiefs were instrumental in ‘mediating British rule’ or, as Mamdani describes, in instituting ‘decentralised despotism’. Native administrations followed ethnic boundaries, except in areas where it was not feasible to form a district (such as West Nile, Bugisu, Bukedi, Toro and Kigezi). Rather than utilizing indigenous leaders, the British deployed the Baganda and its Kiganda (centralised and hierarchical) model of administration in much of Uganda. At the local level, appointed chiefs held judicial, legislative, executive and administrative power. Under the guise of native laws, they forced labour, crops, sales and contributions. The Baganda had another role: to spread the Christian (protestant) gospel to all and sundry. Revolts against Baganda rule became common throughout Uganda. The Banyoro were particularly resentful, and not without cause: Baganda armies had helped the British to conquer the Banyoro (who were, reputedly, fiercely resistant to colonial incursions) and the Basoga. As a reward to Buganda, sizeable portions of Bunyoro land---the Lost Counties---were transferred to Buganda, and the residents made tenants of the Kabaka and his chiefs. There were revolts against other imposed native authorities as well. The Rwenzururu Movement, which started in 1962, demanded separate districts for the Bamba and the Bankonjo, and complete secession from Toro. The Movement resented Batoro subjugation and proceeded to institute a separate Kingdom in the Rwenzori Mountains areas. Though its leader subsequently returned the Kingdom to the Ugandan government in 1983, tensions and sub-nationalist sentiments remain. 1.2.2 DIRECT RULE Centralized administration (via direct rule) excluded native institutions and practices and demanded conformity with European directives. Kanyeihamba (2002) describes what this meant for legal administration. Up until 1920, all executive and legislative powers were invested in the British Commissioner. Subsequently, in 1920, a new Consolidating Order in Council was promulgated, and this provided for executive and legislative councils. However, up until 1926 when one Indian was appointed as an unofficial member, all the councillors were Europeans. The 1926 provision was meant to appease the Indian community and to coordinate the interests of the European and Indian commercial groups, though it was important that Indian involvement was, as far as was possible, restricted. (Indians were brought to Uganda as indentured labourers from the nineteenth century. After the period of indentureship ended, many remained and engaged in commerce) Africans, despite their dissatisfaction with being excluded from government, were considered ‘too backward to contribute much to the development of the country’. Africans were not included until 1945, under the firm stipulation that representatives were to be ‘men of substance and authority, of ripe experience and possessed of a developed sense of responsibility that may be expected of those holding high office in the Native Governments and Administrations’. Further, ‘only Buganda and the Western and Eastern provinces were to be represented’. Northern involvement was denied since, as the governor claimed, ‘their tribal and administrative organisations have not yet in all districts advanced to the stage requiring the creation of centralised native executives’. These attitudes eventually pervaded the churches. Pulford (1999) describes how churches began to charge fees based on race and how missionary schools taught the geography and history of the metropolitan countries. Museveni’s (1997) biography notes the ways in which religion fostered social distinctions: ‘Christianisation’ involved an element of modernisation and this demanded changes…which penetrated to the deepest aspects our traditional culture. It even affected our eating habits because keeping to traditional ways was considered ‘pagan and ungodly’. 1.2.3 The (Under) development of Local Industry The centralized and decentralized administrative/political systems facilitated British economic policy. Uganda was to develop primary products, such as cotton, coffee, sugar, rubber and tea in order to meet the needs of the mother country. Conversely, it was to import manufactured products from Britain. Production and wealth were effectively concentrated in the South, particularly among the elite. The introduction of export crops was done at the expense of local industry, as new taxation policies were developed to ensure that small-scale entrepreneurs were appropriately discouraged. Additionally, small independent traders were either forcibly excluded from the market and/or coerced (largely through intermediaries such as Baganda chiefs) to produce for the metropole (Kasozi 1999; Mamdani 1996) Kasozi notes that the British systematically undermined African industry, while encouraging European and Asian immigration and participation. Between 1949 and 1959, the number of European immigrants increased from 3,448 to 10,866. Over that same period, the number of Asian (Indo-Pakistani) immigrants increased from 35,215 to 71, 933. While the Baganda were preoccupied with land ownership and administration, Asians became involved in commerce: retail and wholesale trade, cotton ginning, coffee and sugar processing. The British encouraged this, though for their profit. By the late 1940s, the banks were British or Indian-based. Kasozi notes that banks rarely lent to Africans, though they accumulated African savings. Africans were largely excluded from wholesale trade as, according to colonial policy, licenses could only be issued to traders who owned permanent buildings of stone or concrete. In 1959, ‘Africans handled less than 10% of national trade’. This colonial policy provoked intense resentment; Africans felt alienated and for a long time regarded Asians as foreigners and exploiters. Idi Amin tried to capitalize on African discontent, at a huge cost to the economy. (See 1.3 Dislocation and Destruction: Independence – 1986) 1.2.4 The (Under)development of the North The North was used as a reservoir for labour and later, soldiers. When, in 1925, the new Director of Agriculture started to encourage cotton production in the North, he was summarily advised that ‘the policy of government is at present to refrain from actively stimulating the production of cotton or other economic crops in outlying districts on which it is dependent for a supply of labour for carrying out of essential services in the central producing districts’. This economic zoning of the country perpetuated the neglect and underdevelopment in the North and fomented regional tensions. It also ingrained feelings of superiority in the South and inferiority (at least in terms of production). However, the North had the means to retaliate, as it monopolized the use of force. The Acholi succeeded the Nubians (Ugandans of Sudanese descent), who up until the Sudanese mutiny (1897) were regarded as the ‘best material for soldiery in Africa’. Lwanga-Lunyiigo argues that the British ascribed to a ‘martial tribes’ thesis that prioritised the Nilotic and Sudanese people of Northern Uganda. These groups were considered the most satisfactory fit for the theory that soldiers should be of a different race, geographically distant and even hostile to the main groups. The Acholi were recruited to the Kings Africa Rifles, with the mandate to ‘take action against any local group(s) in the Protectorate which engaged in active opposition to the Administration’. Lwanga-Lunyiigo is clear that ‘colonialism built up the army as an instrument of coercion as a pacifying army, not as a people’s force to ensure defence against external aggression’. Furthermore, much of Uganda, including the Northerners, came to believe that only groups from the North had the right to bear arms. He emphasizes that this was a ‘myth’ that both Milton Obote and Idi Amin (See Section 1.3 below ) exploited, and the source of ‘the most bitter legacies of colonialism’. 1.2.5 The Language Problem The lack of a common Ugandan language helped to perpetuate inter-group and inter-regional conflicts {Kasozi 1999). According to recent estimates, 70% of Ugandans speak one of the Bantu languages. Bantu ethnic groups are concentrated in the South and include the Ganda, Soga, Ankole, Nyoro, and Toro. Western Nilotic speakers (Acholi, Lango and Alur) live in the North; Eastern Nilotic speakers (Karamojong, Teso, and Turkana) live in the Northeast and Sudanic speakers (the Lugbara) in the northwest. (See Map of Uganda) Though the British government had introduced Kiswahili into the primary school curriculum, it subsequently declared that all vernaculars, including Kiswahili, were subordinate to English. Meanwhile, the Christian hierarchy discouraged Kiswhaili, regarding it as the language of Islam; the Baganda discounted it as the language of ‘prostitutes and thieves’ and subsequently, as it was used among the army, it became known as’ the language of violence’. Therefore, English became the official language for administration. Kasozi (1999) notes that as is not common among the peasants, English is another ‘stratifying agent’, dividing society into ‘the privileged who speak it and the deprived who do not’. 1.3 DISLOCATION AND DESTRUCTION: INDEPENDENCE – 1986 Despite the colonial precedent, few would have predicted Uganda’s considerable post-Independence decline; instead, there was an expectation that economic growth would continue, with a leading role for the Baganda elite. However, whereas ethnicity had been used as the mode of indirect colonial rule, it now became the medium of protest. Further, religion, ethnicity and politics were mixed in very unhealthy ways. People, particularly those from the North who were widely resentful of the Baganda’s prestige and privilege, supported Milton Obote’s Uganda People’s Congress (UPC), which comprised a distinctly non-Baganda but Protestant majority. Obote was soon to discover that without Baganda support he would be unable to win a governing majority. Accordingly, he formed an alliance with Buganda’s Kabaka Yekka (King before All) party in order to exclude the Democratic Party, which was predominantly Catholic. At Independence in 1962, Obote was elected Prime Minister and Kabaka Mutesa II, President. Under the terms of the agreement, Buganda would have authority over the other kingdoms, as well as representation in the National Assembly. The alliance disintegrated shortly thereafter and culminated with the Kabaka’s forceful expulsion from Uganda. Obote now declared himself President and set about destroying all ‘kingdoms and feudalism’; dictating a new constitution and establishing a one-party state; and assuming control of commercial enterprises. In response to real and perceived threats to his position, Obote used the largely Northern-sourced (and British and Israeli trained) military to crush the opposition. Therefore, in less than a decade after Independence, people had lost faith in the promises of procedural and substantive democracy. As Brett describes it, ‘bullets rather than ballots dominated politics’. When Idi Amin—Obote’s former ally and Army Chief of Staff---capitalized on tensions within the army and deposed Obote in absentia, there was popular approval both at home and abroad. This was another ‘new dawn’. During his first year of rule, Amin seemed intent on building legitimacy and support, including between the Baganda and religious groups. However, by 1972, when he recognised that his overtures had had little effect, Amin launched a frenetic economic and political programme, which involved expelling 70,000 Asians and capturing their assets (immediately removing needed business skills and access to credit); appointing Muslims to key positions in the army, thereby alienating the majority Christian country; attacking the Langi and Acholi and isolating the north; dismantling the Kingdom of Buganda into separate districts; and dissolving the Cabinet. Amin succeeded in building enemies in all parts and, in a final attempt to secure his regime, succumbed to what Low describes as a ‘reckless and bestial’ slaughter of whole communities, prominent individuals (including the Chief Justice of Uganda and the Vice-Chancellor of Makerere) and members of his Cabinet. Amin’s assault on the Church demonstrated his paranoia. He considered himself threatened by small independent and Pentecostal churches, as they were supposed to have international connections that could work against him. The Catholic and Anglican churches had substantial support among the majority of Ugandans and could, therefore, be easily mobilised. There are reports that even Muslims were persecuted. Archbishop Luwun was apparently assassinated because he was from Obote’s Lwo ethnic group, and though he was not involved in politics, the Archbishop had been forced, on occasion, to make submissions on behalf of the Langi and Acholi (Ward 1995). Amin’s reach extended beyond Uganda. Maintaining that Uganda had rights to parts of Tanzania, Sudan, and Kenya, he started his assault on Tanzania in 1978. Ugandan soldiers occupied parts of Tanzania for over two months, persecuted citizens and killed livestock. Tanzania retaliated by invading Uganda and taking Kampala. Amin was ousted; his era of terror ended in 1979. Lule, the non-royal Muganda who succeeded Amin, was rather unconvincing as a leader and was soon overthrown by Binaisa, also a Muganda. However, Binaisa lacked popular support and alienated many within the army when he sacked Museveni, then the Minister of Defence, and the Army Chief of Staff. Army officials replaced Binaisa with Paulo Muwanga, a former member of the Uganda National Congress. In 1980, Milton Obote succeeded Muwanga in a purportedly fraudulent election. Religion, ethnicity and politics were crucial in this election. Ward (1995) notes that constituency boundaries were drawn so as to split the predominantly Catholic (DP) areas. In Buganda, DP was the party of choice, even among Protestants. The Baganda were fearful that Obote would attempt to reduce the Kingdom’s autonomy and that the Anglicans would support him. In the north and east, where there was deep resentment of the Baganda, people (especially the Lwo and Ateso) voted for the UPC. Under Obote’s second term, ethnic flavoured politics continued and was again characterised by Northern appointments to the army and a repressive military campaign against non-UPC supporters (also played out in the churches). Obote’s attempt at political monopoly provoked widespread resistance in the South and West Nile, with armed opposition from the People’s Resistance Army (PRA), under Yoweri Museveni’s guidance. Museveni was born in Southwest Uganda, among the Banyankore Bahima. He studied political science in Tanzania---where he was greatly influenced by socialist ideologies---and trained in counterinsurgency in Mozambique. His People’s Resistance Army (PRA) largely comprised Banyankole, Baganda and Bayarwanda soldiers. In 1981, the PRA joined with Yusuf Lule’s Uganda Freedom Fighters, and formed the National Resistance Movement. The NRM comprised the National Resistance Council and the National Resistance Army; the latter had responsibility for ‘organizing and winning the war effort, politicising the army, educating the public and defending the population’ (Kasozi, 1999). The NRA spread quickly through Ankole, Buganda and Toro, and solidified peasant support with its socialist ideologies and practical strategies for building citizenship. Meanwhile, Obote increased his efforts to eradicate the NRA and launched “Operation Bonanza” in 1982. This failed, and Obote’s soldiers resorted to a brutal slaughter of villagers, which many claim, was even more extreme that Amin’s; it is estimated that over 100000 Ugandans were killed in the Luwero Triangle. In 1985, Barjilio Okello deposed Obote, who had, by then, lost much support even within his government. The Military Council, which was formed to administer the country, installed General Tito Okello Lutwa as president, and Barjilio Okello as chief of staff. Negotiations between the Okello regime and the NRM started but quickly stalled, amidst charges that the Military Council had reneged on agreements and had flagrantly abused human rights. In January 1986, the NRA toppled the Okello regime and the NRM became Uganda’s eighth government. 1.4 NRM AND THE CHALLENGES OF REFORM Kasozi (1999) analyses the social conditions that produced the violence in Uganda, and categorizes them as social inequality (generated by unequal trading relationships and local regional, ethnic, religious and gender disparities); the existence of sub-states, ethnic and religious factionalism; poor conflict resolution mechanisms; absence of an indigenous property-owning class; the post-Independence decrease in national production; parochial, weak and poorly educated leaders; and the language problem. He notes the following: 1. ‘On the eve of independence, colonial Uganda was…a resource-rich country [that] had long been paying the costs of its administration and by 1916 was no longer a burden to the taxpayer’; 2. ‘After independence, unlike Kenya, Uganda attracted no substantial foreign investment or aid, and unlike other dependent ex-colonies Uganda’s subsistence sector was not only self-supporting but very strong’; 3. ‘Life expectancy was for a long time as impressive as that of some industrialized countries; the literacy rate was high, road and communications systems were good and medical services reasonable’; 4. [By 1985] over one million Ugandans were killed; overall life expectancy [was reduced] from over fifty to forty years; infant mortality increased from 91.9/1000 in 1973 to 100/1000 in 1984; maternal mortality increased; the ratio of doctors per population decreased from 1/10000 to 1/25000; ‘ignorance, disease and poverty became the norm of many Ugandans of all social classes’. In 1988, Low cautiously predicted that the NRM had a ‘better chance of success than any of its predecessors’. First, the NRM had managed to build a fairly credible coalition, comprised of representatives from former political parties, Bantu southerners and Baganda supporters. Second, the South now had an army, which in principle was not permitted to abuse or kill any member of the public; this boosted the NRM’s image. Third, a Southern-based government, with its core support around it, would have less urgent security concerns; previous northern political leaders were always on guard against ‘close enemies’. Museveni’s immediate (post-coup) political moves helped him to build some legitimacy beyond his ‘heartland’ area in the South and Southwest and, importantly, to raise expectations of broad public participation, government accountability and improved welfare. Consistent with the democracy, security and unity objectives outlined in its Ten-Point Programme, the NRM expanded Resistance Councils (RCs) to the entire country. RCs, which had previously been established in the areas under guerrilla control, operated on the principle that decision-making power, authority and policy-making responsibilities should also be located at the local levels and that citizens should be able to reach and influence their representatives and hold them to account for the quality of services. The Local Council (LC) system that replaced it, operated on the same principles. Uganda was to be a distinct no-party democracy. Apart from promoting inclusion at these levels, Museveni’s strategy for conflict prevention entailed incorporation of hitherto moderate and virulent critics within government. Dicklitch notes that this elite cooptation effectively fragmented the opposition into moderate and radical camps. While the moderate group resigned itself to cooperate and participate in government, the radical elements continued to firmly insist on multiparty democracy. Supported by a hopeful donor community, Museveni committed himself to economic growth, political stability and legitimacy. Uganda’s economy responded with an average growth rate of 6% in the 1990s. Donors pronounced that Uganda was, indeed, ‘a pioneer of macroeconomic stabilization and structural adjustment in sub-Saharan Africa’, while even the more strident critics acknowledged that the Movement deserved to be credited for improving and sustaining peace and security in most parts of the country, allowing a fairly free press, and encouraging participation through democratically elected local government. However, in recent years, donors have become more cautious in their evaluation of Uganda and less restrained commentators are beginning to expose actual and potential risks to development. Among the more frequently cited issues are the long-standing (North-South) regional inequalities; insecurity in Northern Uganda, the Southwest and the Great Lakes region; increasing tensions within the Movement and the political challenge to Museveni from within the heartland constituencies; the recent downturn in the economy and the evidence of growing inequalities; youth disaffection and the potential political risks; legacies of ethnic, religious and other social divisions, and the implications for political change; patronage, corruption and their costs to development; the character of the formal institutions and implications for stability. 1.5 SUMMARY This section reviewed important features in Uganda’s historical development. It depicts the regional, religious and ethnic divisions that preceded the colonial period and summarizes some of the ways in which the British administration capitalized on pre-existing tensions and provoked new divisions. British protectorate policies entailed both direct and indirect forms of rule. Direct rule excluded native institutions; indirect rule used and/or constructed native institutions to enforce local control. British economic policies resulted in growth and in development of the infrastructure but also stifled local industry; promoted unequal trade relations; and encouraged ethnic, race, regional and class divisions between the Baganda and the rest of the population; North and South; Europeans, Asians and Africans; a small wealthy landed and commercial elite and a majority poor. Despite these, Uganda, at Independence, had favourable prospects for development; analysts did not anticipate the drastic social and economic decline that occurred under Obote and Amin. Since 1986, the Movement has made substantial development gains. However, there are questions about the stability of these achievements, and concerns that development goals may be at risk.